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 A well-functioning financial system plays an important role in resources allocation and credit 
expansion, and is vital in stimulating economic growth by fueling investment and consumption. 
Development of efficient financial system should therefore be one of the main priorities of a 
developing nation such as Ethiopia. The county has achieved phenomenal economic growth 
over the last decades and advanced well in modernizing its financial sector. However, the 
financial sector in the country is one of the least developed in the world. In order to sustain the 
growth achieved in the recent past, the financial sector needs to be more efficient and inclusive. 
Identification of the credit-constrained households is a vital step in that process. Ethiopian 
Socioeconomic survey (ESS) was made available for this thesis and it was useful in providing 
valuable information about the households’ credit situation. For this study, the aim has been to 
identify determinants of credit constraint in Ethiopia. These includes investigation of variables 
such personal, household and demographical characteristics of the households. Regression 
based on bivariate probit model with sample selection using maximum-likelihood estimations 
has been performed on the dataset. Descriptive methods shaded additional light on the available 
survey. The study uncovered that age, gender, education of the household head along with the 
size and location of the household influenced the households’ fate in the credit market. The 
findings of this study and studies like this could have impact further than the academic world. 
Policy makers benefit from such information when they devise strategies to move towards a 
fairer and more inclusive credit sector.   
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Ethiopia is geographically located in the horn of Africa. The country shares its northern border 
with Eritrea, the eastern with Djibouti and Somalia, the western with Sudan and South Sudan 
and the southern with Kenya. With its 1.1 million km2 area the country is subdivided into 9 
regional states, the Dire Dawa city and the capital city Addis Ababa (Commission, 2008).  
The largest contributor to the Ethiopian economy is the agricultural sector. The agricultural 
sector makes up more than 80 % of exports and just above 45% of the GDP (Wiedmaier-Pfister 
et al., 2008).  The major export crops produced in the agricultural sector are coffee beans, oil 
seeds and flowers (Getnet, 2014). This sector has been one of the main fuels of the countries 
much talked about growth over the past decade. However, the agricultural sector still remains 
largely inefficient (Getnet, 2014). 
The Agricultural sector employs around 85% of the work force (Getnet, 2014). The majority of 
Ethiopian farmers are smallholder farmers with about a hectare of land per household in average 
(Obo, 2009). Additionally these farmers use outdates farming systems often relaying on the 
unpredictable rainy seasons (Getnet, 2014). Ethiopia has been hit by several drought over its 
resent history(Bachewe et al., 2016). These draughts have often led to a widespread famine 
over the entire country. The current drought in the country is related to a weather phenomena 
known as El Niño (Bachewe et al., 2016). It has persisted for several years and has led to the 
worst drought in 50 years. More than 10 million people are reported to be in need of food aid, 
and about half million children suffering from malnutrition(Bachewe et al., 2016). The frequent 
incidence of the El Niño over the last decades has been attributed to the climate changes due to 
global warming. If these effects persist the livelihood of many small scale farmers will be 
compromised and in some cases they will have fatal consequences unless a solution is 
found(Wolde-Georgis, 1997). The efficiency issue in the agricultural sector is not solely 
constrained to the dependency on climate conditions. The size of the farms together with the 
old fashioned methods employed by the farmers affect also their productivity even when the 
rainy seasons are satisfactory(Getnet, 2014). The aforementioned factors along with the lack of 
fertilizers and high yield seeds in the smallholder farmers’ inventory hampers the future 
prospects of the agricultural sector(Obo, 2009).  
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Most of the farmers in Ethiopia reside in the rural areas. Above 80% the 90 million people are 
currently found in rural areas(Obo, 2009). The rural population faces lack of basic health and 
education facilities and frail transport, communication and power services. In addition most of 
these households are often living below the poverty line(Obo, 2009).  
To meet the food demand of the expanding Ethiopian population the agricultural sector needs 
increase productivity considerably(Bachewe et al., 2016). The hardships that is likely to be 
caused by the ongoing global climate change, reduction of farmable land due to urbanization 
and cyclic nature of commodity price makes solving the shortcomings of the agricultural sectors 
even more urgent. In order to attain higher productivity in the agricultural sector, the farmers 
need to gain access to modern farming equipment. The dependence on the climatic conditions 
can be reduced by improving irrigation facilities and use of ground water. The productivity 
could be further improved by giving access of fertilizers and high yield seeds to the majority of 
the farmers(Dercon and Hill, 2009).  
The suggestions mentioned above are expensive, and the smallholder farmers living under the 
poverty line with limited access to credit markets are excluded from enjoying the benefits of 
modern technology. The formal financial sector in Ethiopia have inadequate inclusion of the 
rural areas(Obo, 2009). This can be explained in part by the uncertainty related to smallholder 
farmers’ income, lack of collateral and development of the rural markets. On the other hand the 
informal credit markets are often unreliable and expensive.  In addition to the lack of access to 
the credit market, the rural farmers cannot sell or use their land as collateral due to the 
governments land policy(Obo, 2009). The access of financial services such as deposit accounts, 
credit and insurance are therefore central to the process of improving to the productivity of the 
agricultural system and improving the living standard of the rural population.  Having access 
to the financial services enables the poor rural population to make investments that improve the 
productivity of their land such as better seeds, fertilizers and improving irrigation 
facilities(Dercon and Hill, 2009). These investments make the smallholder farmers more robust 
to unexpected to adversities (fluctuating prices, plant disease, variations in the amount of rain).  
Development of inclusive and fair financial sector in the rural markets is important for welfare 
and future economic prospects of the rural population and the overall economic outlook. 
This study focus on understanding the mechanisms that control credit distribution in Ethiopia 
using the Ethiopian Socio-economic survey (ESS). Descriptive and regressions analysis are 
performed on the dataset that was made available for this study. The descriptive results is 
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designed to aid the regression analysis in interpreting the various variables and their effect on 
who receives and who is denied credit. Bivariate Probit regression with sample selection 
method is used to model the regression analysis and divide the represented households in to 
those with and without demand for credit. The ones without demand for credit are left out and 
further analysis is carried out on the remaining households. The formal and informal credit 
sectors are studied separately prior to a summary of the combined effect. This is done in order 
to get a detailed understanding of the credit markets. Variables such as household size, gender, 
education level of the household head and differences across the regional states are examined 
for both sectors. In addition, an overall assessment of the borrowers and lenders is also 
undertaken.        
Understanding the circumstance around the financial institutions in particular the rural market 
is a vital step in solving the rural credit conundrum (Dercon and Hill, 2009). In order to expand 
the financial institution, one needs to understand the group that has demand that is met and 
which has the unmet demand. This understanding has importance beyond the academic world. 
The Policy makers can use such information in devising targeted strategies to impact groups 
that have been discriminated. These policies can have huge implication for the individuals and 
households that are directly or indirectly affect especially for the rural small-scale farmers.  
Studies using similar methods have been earlier conducted in Ethiopia using an older dataset. 
The same methods have also been applied elsewhere in examining the credit markets. There is 
a successful study using data from Mexico has been executed in order to measure the incidence 
of credit constraint. This study differs from the others as a new dataset has been provided by 
center for statistics agency of Ethiopia (CSA) and the World Bank. 
The next chapter focuses on the theoretical background of financial systems especially the 
financial sector in Ethiopia. It is followed by the data and methodology chapter III. The survey 
used in this thesis is reviewed along with the methods used in examining it. The results of the 
descriptive and regression analysis are described in chapter IV, while discussion and conclusion 







2.1.1 Financial markets 
The practice of lending and borrowing in human history can be traced back to Babylon. The 
Babylonians introduced a legal framework to regulate the custom of loaning money and goods 
as early as 1800 B.C(Armstrong, 2016). Valid loans at the time of the Babylonians had to 
include a written contract with the oversight of a public official. These contracts could include 
a pledge of security in form of land and other possessions including the wife, children and 
slaves of the borrower. The state regulated interest rates by setting maximum annual interest 
rate the lender could claim from the borrower (Armstrong, 2016).1 The legal systems and 
institutions around borrowing and lending has been evolving and improving throughout the 
major human civilizations since then2 (Dennis, 2015).  
Credit is today broadly defined as an «agreement or promise»  of transaction between lender 
and borrowers, where borrowers receive something of assessment now and repays sometime in 
the future(Hodgman, 1960). A well-functioning financial system that makes an efficient 
transaction of credit possible is essential to the functioning of the overall economy. Effective 
resource allocation and credit expansion materializes as a result of a well-functioning financial 
system, and leads to economic growth by increasing investment and consumption (Khan and 
Semlali, 2000). The process of credit and liquidity provision has various participants with their 
own distinct roles and interests. The main participants in the loan markets include lenders, 
borrowers, regulators and governments.  
Lenders participate in the financial system by providing credit and liquidity to the 
borrowers(Hodgman, 1960). In return the lenders expect to be repaid in timely manner with 
interest and/or fees that are agreed on the terms of the loan. Interest rate on the credit varies 
based on the amount, riskiness of the borrower and the supply and demand of credit in the loan 
market. The banking sector is central to any financial system and play a pivotal role in suppling 
credit to the market(http://fsi.gov.au/, 07.12.2014). However, lender can also be a private 
person, a group of people, companies or even governments. The funds provided cover various 
types of needs such as mortgage payments, start-ups, business expansions and consume.  






By consuming the credit made available by the lender, borrowers play an important role in the 
financial system. Borrowers enter the financial market intending to get a loan to cover a need. 
As with the lenders, the borrower can be a single person, group of people, companies or even 
governments.     
In order to ensure a smooth interaction between the lenders and the borrowers, the financial 
system needs to be fair, transparent and non-discriminatory (Khan and Semlali, 2000). This is 
achieved by having a responsible set of lenders and borrowers.  However, one cannot assume 
that every participant in the market always approaches the market with integrity (Spence, 1981). 
Therefore having a strong and impartial regulatory organ is essential. The regulation from the 
government follows the constitutional law and protects both participators. Governments have 
several roles in the financial markets in addition to being providers and consumers of credit in 
the market(Addison and Geda, 2001).  Since the looking after the long term national interest is 
one of government’s main responsibilities, it has to develop policies that allow the financial 
systems to function in a way that benefits the people (Addison and Geda, 2001).  
Transaction of credit in general involves risk for the lenders and borrowers (Spence, 1981). 
Understanding the risk involved when a lender approves a loan to a borrower is vital to the 
pricing of the loan. The wellbeing of the overall economy depends also in the ability of the 
banking sector to measure the risk (Geda and Yimer, 2014). In general individual, public and 
private debtors are often checked for their credit worthiness before credit transaction is made.  
In addition, preserving scheme such as requirements of collateral and assets are mostly required 
by lenders as insurance. Beside such measurement of borrower’s ability, lenders can further use 
signaling and screening system (Spence, 1981).     
We can frame the loan market by dividing preference and characteristic of lenders and 
borrowers. Based on the source of the credit the interaction between lenders and borrows can 
take place in both a formal and informal market. Following Fichera`s description formal market 
is defined as regulated and licensed institution by financial and central bank (Fichera, 2010). 
Whereas, an informal market is characterized by the lack of regulatory supervision. As shown 
in table 2.1 informal lenders includes loan from relative, friends, moneylender etc. The 
categories for formal lenders include commercial banks, “micro creditors”, cooperatives etc.  
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Table 2-1 Description of formal and informal lenders 
Formal lenders Informal lenders 
Banks Friends and relatives  
Cooperative  Sosial insurance (Iddir) 
Governmental programs Saving Programs (Equb) 
Women’s Association Grocery/local merchants  
HAB Project Money lenders 
Mobile Neighbors 
Private banks  
Micro and smal Enterprise   
 
Fischera highlights that the relationship between formal and informal market as to be 
indeterminate, based on the existing theories (Fichera, 2010). Literature found this relationship 
to be substitution, complementary and competitive(Fichera, 2010). Household that might be 
constrained from the formal market can use the informal market as complementary. 
Furthermore, competition between this to lenders might increase the demand only form one 
suppliers, (this is also known as crowding out)(Spence, 1981). Substitution relationship relies 
on availability of both, and the use of previous credit on affecting credit-worthiness of the 
household, for example increase in credit-worthiness if household have had credit from formal 
market earlier and (vice versa)(Fichera, 2010). Borrowers approach informal lenders for several 
reasons such as accessibility and rejection by the formal lenders. The borrower capacity to pay 
the price of a loan from the formal market can also be considered as a reason to approach the 




2.2 Financial system in Ethiopia 
The current market based financial system in Ethiopia is relatively young. Following the 
overthrowing of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974, Ethiopia was under control of Derg with 
Marxism-Leninism as its state ideology(Clark, 2000). During this era the Ethiopian financial 
system followed in the footsteps of their Soviet counterparts. As a consequence of that the tools 
needed to regulate and supervise financial markets in a market-based financial system were 
underdeveloped towards the end of that era(Clark, 2000). Since fall of the Derg in 1991 the 
country has been pursuing “gradualism” as a strategy for the financial system(Clark, 2000). The 
strategy involves an incremental privatization of  the many of the state owned financial 
institution and enterprises, and further strengthening of  regulatory and supervisory organs of 
the financial systems. This process leads to the emergence of new financial institutions, and 
preexisting institutions redefining their roles as the country heads towards a more market based 
financial system. (Addison and Geda, 2001).  
Since the introduction of the market based system in 1991, the financial system has witnessed 
the introductions of many private banks and reform in the state owned financial institutions 
(Addison and Geda, 2001). The whole process started in 1992 with the establishment of market 
based foreign exchange(Addison and Geda, 2001). A reform of the National Bank of Ethiopia 
(NBE) and the introduction of private banks and insurance companies in 1994 followed the 
initial steps taken as part of the new fiscal policy (Addison and Geda, 2001).  NBE was assigned 
regulatory and supervisory tasks. Development of the tools necessary to regulate and supervise 
was set as one of its main priorities. Moreover several private banks and insurance companies 
were allowed to enter the market (Addison and Geda, 2001). Private Banks have increased their 
market share from 0% in 1996(Addison and Geda, 2001) to 45% of loans and advances now 
(MFWA)3(Africa, 2016). The demand for credit from the private sector grew as several small 
and medium sizes state owned enterprises and large scale state farms were privatized (Addison 
and Geda, 2001). Microfinance has developed well and reaches 2.4 million Ethiopians(Ageba 
and Amha, 2006). (MFWA) (Africa, 2016). This shows many of the steps taken in transitioning 
to marked based financial sector have worked. However, the financial system remains under 
developed. The loan markets are still mainly dominated by the state-owned Commercial Bank 
of Ethiopia (CBE)(Africa, 2016).  Mobile banking in Ethiopia lags behind its counterparts in 
the sub-Saharan Africa. Stock market is totally absent in Ethiopia, while commodity exchange 
                                                          
3 https://www.mfw4a.org/ethiopia/financial-sector-profile.html#c10806 
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and the other financial institutions remain at the early stages of their developments (Africa, 
2016, Addison and Geda, 2001, Mulupi, 15.04.2015). 
Following two and half decades of reviving the financial sector, there are in total 19 commercial 
banks in Ethiopia (Africa, 2016). There are (3) public and (16) private banks in Ethiopia with 
about 1376 branches among them in 2012 (Financial inclusion, regulation and inclusive growth 
in Ethiopia). The banking sector is dominated by the state owned banks, while foreign banks 
are totally absent in Ethiopia (Addison and Geda, 2001). Even though the progress in the 
financial sector especially the banking sector has been encouraging in the recent history of the 
country, the number of households with access to the formal credit market remain limited. With 
only 10% of the house olds having access to the banking sector, NGOs and the government 
have looked for other solutions to the coverage issue (Obo, 2009). 
In addition to the banks, there are various microfinance institutions, saving and credit 
cooperatives that are trying to solve the credit access problem of the poor. The microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) play a vital role in terms of credit access, saving mobilization and to some 
extent micro-insurance services to the excluded majority(Obo, 2009). Micro credit is source of 
loan(Morduch, 1999). NGOs, charity organization and other association can give micro credit. 
The Micro credit contains often small amount of money for a group of people that are organized 
in a society (Akerlof, 1995). Consequently, such system works differently given the asymmetric 
information problems they are facing. The asymmetric problems often occur due to lack of 
collateral, insurance and the risky environment they are facing(Akerlof, 1995). Under such 
system, some micro creditors use groups to insurance as Grameen bank in Bangladesh(Jain, 
1996). While other apply another method to provide loan and repayment based on their 
associations. 
 There were 31 registered MFIs and above 8200 saving and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) in 
2013 (Africa, 2016). The largescale microfinance institutions are financed and managed by 
governmental and non-governmental organizations (Obo, 2009). Some funds have been made 
available for MFIs from Development Bank of Ethiopia (DBE) with an interest rate at as low 
as 8.5% (Africa, 2016).  As with the rest of financial sector the MFIs have made large strides 
since their starts in 1996 and had a total capital of about 220 million USD in 2012(Africa, 2016, 
Addison and Geda, 2001).  
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Table 2.2. The performance of MFI in USD starting in 2004 to 2013 
  
7.1 million people have access to saving accounts in the traditional banks in Ethiopia as of 
2013(Africa, 2016). This makes up 8% of the total population. The picture gets grimmer when 
one looks at the borrowers (only 112 793). The borrowers of the banks are mainly large and old 
firms (Africa, 2016, Obo, 2009). The MFIs and SACCOs have tried to enhance inclusiveness 
in the financial market(Bayrau et al., 2013). Small and micro enterprises along with the rural 
population have benefited from the expansion of MFIs and SACCO (Bayrau et al., 2013, Ageba 
and Amha, 2006). 
Table 2.2 shows the adventurous growth exhibits by the MFIs for the last decade (Bayrau et al., 
2013). However, a closer look at the MFIs shows that large challenges remain with regard to 
inclusiveness. About 75% of total capital in the MFI is owned by four regional government 
owned MFIs (Amhara, Dedebit, Oromo and Omo credit and savings institution) and only 14,5% 
of the population of the country has coverage by the MFIs (Bayrau et al., 2013).  
Excluded from the formal financial market 85% of the population seeks towards the informal 
market to meet their credit demands(Bayrau et al., 2013). Degfee mention the high cost of 
transaction linked to screening, absence of appropriate information about the borrowers and a 
great risk of default as reasons for the limited inclusiveness by the formal sector in Ethiopia, 
especially in rural areas (Obo, 2009).  
  
For the informal market describes the transaction between neighbor and relatives to be affected 
by the personal familiarity of characteristic (Bardhan and Udry, 1999). In Ethiopia Degefe 
explains the occurrence of informal lending through iddir and iqub, community grounded 
funding sector (Obo, 2009). Iddir, operates as informal insurance, providing necessary social 
financial support in the community for management of shocks (Aredo, 1993). Iddir-related 
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service might occur as contribution from common money pool, support with labor, food, drinks, 
and comfort during grief (Obo, 2009). Degefe defines iddir as “regularly contribution to a 
common poll-in- cash or kind- with a view to supporting needy members contribute to common 
criteria for membership” (Obo, 2009). Iqub refers to rotating savings and credit associations, 
also known as Roscas (Aredo, 1993). The participators in iqub accumulate money frequently 
to the common pool by agreement amongst them(Aredo, 1993, Obo, 2009). 
Degefe, argues that transactions among friends and relatives to account for more than  the credit 
organized through iddir and iqub, based on the Ethiopian culture and reciprocal support (Obo, 
2009). Credit attribute to the moneylenders is reported to be trivial by Degefe (Obo, 2009, 
Asmelash, 2003). The perception on moneylender appears to be undesirable and can be clarify 
through tradition value and the law in Ethiopia (Obo, 2009). 
2.3 Credit constraints 
Credit constraints can be explained as incidence that take place when a demanding individual 
are hindered from getting credit. Reasoning for constrained might appear as discouragement for 
approach of creditors and lack of creditors. The probability of being constrained in Ethiopia can 
be predicted to be higher among rural areas and poor household (Freeman et al., 1998). 
According to previous studies several factors such as transaction cost, default rate, 
infrastructure and limited access to credit have be mentioned as reasoning for credit constraint’s 
in Ethiopia. Kertu (Kertu: 2007), reports the lack of access and efficiency among the lenders to 
cause inflexible loans and not reaching the vulnerable (rural) residence.  
Efficient training on financial management for the borrowers can effectivities the transaction 
of credit. Further, it might also reduce the high default rate that Werku (Werku: 2010) reports 
occurs in Ethiopia. The access for creditors have been mentioned as scares (Gobezie, 2005). 
These can be explained by poor infrastructure, which leaves residence in poorer providence out 
of the credit market. The distance between the lenders and borrowers might affect the psychical 
approach and rise the transaction cost. Secondly, most of bank services occur in urban areas 
leaving other residence out (Gobezi, 2005). Most of the residence that are left out of credit 
service can be highly presented by rural population. Overall barriers on access for credit is 




3.1 Data and methodology  
 
This thesis is carried out using the Ethiopia Socio-economic survey (ESS). The survey is 
conducted by the Central Statistics Agency of Ethiopia (CSA) in collaboration with the World 
Bank Living Standard Measurement Study-Integrate Survey of Agriculture (LSMS-ISA). The 
data collection is funded by the Bill and Melinda gates foundation, and is intended to provide 
high quality household data for evidence-based policymaking.  
ESS is a panel survey that contains data about human capital, economic activities and access to 
different resources and services in households mainly engaging in agricultural activities. Unlike 
its predecessor (Ethiopian rural socioeconomic survey (ERSS)), ESS contains data from the 
urban areas in addition to the rural population. There are total of 433 enumeration areas (EA)4 
represented in the survey with 290 from rural areas, 43 from small towns and the rest from 
major urban areas. The EA are spread evenly across the 9 regional states and the two chartered 
cities weighted by population, and contain data from 15 households each. The survey is thus 
designed and conducted to be representative of the entire country. Sampling design were 
selected by multi-stage, cluster design. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of the EAs. Further, 
sample of household by zone and region is presented in appendix c as table 3.1.  
  
                                                          
4 Enumeration Area: Is the smallest geographical unit (piece of land) into which the country is 
divided for census or survey enumeration. 
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Table 3-1 Sample design from ESS 
 
Source: From ESS 
With the intension of improving the data quality the majority of the field staff employed for the 
ERSS were also employed for the ESS. The staff received further training on various occasion 
by the CSA and World Bank. Further, household that were interviewed in ERSS were re-
interviewed for the ESS. The data set in its earlier version have been used to conduct research 
covering topics such as Migration in Ethiopia, effect of remittance and poverty analysis in urban 
Ethiopia. 
 
The survey is collected by visiting scheduled households for an in depth interviews. In various 
literatures, this method is referred to as direct method since direct contact with the “subject” is 
made to obtain the first-hand information. The expansion from ERSS enables the new project 
with broader information by including samples from all regions and urban areas. ESS were 
conducted in three increments. First round was concluded in October of 2013, where it 
composed data on post-planting agriculture activities. Second round took place in November & 
December 2013 and gathered information about livestock. The last & third round consists of 
gathering data about household, post-harvest agriculture and community in February and April 
2014. The new setting with ESS is the capacity to monitor the same household overtime. This 
makes it possible to follow household’s decision-making process under changing circumstances 
and as unforeseen events occurs.        
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Table 3.2 portray how the files in the data set are build. The files are divided in five categories 
covering household, community, post-planting and post-harvest questionnaires. For this 
research we focus on questionnaires from the household category. Diverse information about 
the households are given in different categories. The setups for household categories are 
portrayed in the table 3.2.  
Table 3.2 Present files for ESS questionnaires  
 
Questionnaires 
Household  Demographics, education, health, labor, food and non-food 
expenditure, food security, shock, assets and credit  
Community Infrastructure, community organization, resource management, 
changes in the community & local retail price information  
Post-planting & post-
harvest agriculture 
Farm labor, inputs use, GPS land area measurement, agriculture 
capital, irrigation, crop harvest and utilization  
Livestock Animal holdings and costs, production, cost & sales of 
livestock byproducts  
Source: from ESS-survey 
The data set provides this study with rich and valuable measurements about the various types 
of households. ESS data set contains characteristic of household in form of the social, 
behavioral, demographic, commodity, livestock, economical and more. In addition, the survey 










3.2 Methodology  
 
As indicated in the objective of this research, our purpose is to evaluate credit constrained 
household. This section explains the methods used to identify the broad participation in credit 
market, provided by the ESS. In addition, description of how credit constraints household are 
identified is explained. The model chosen here is taken in the basis of the ability to express the 
relationship between the variables used to evaluate household. 
3.3 Direct and indirect approach  
Two approaches have been used as empirical methodologies to identify credit constraints. 
These approaches are called direct and indirect approach. Indirect approach have been 
explained as procedure to determinants credit constraints based on analysis of permanent theory 
developed by Milton Friedman (Diagne et al., 2000). Consumption smoothing is thought to be 
the main driving force behind the credit demand in this approach. Large data set is reported to 
be needed to carry out the indirect approach (Love and Sánchez, 2009).Further, throughout their 
life cycle household maximizes utility by saving under high transitory revenue and borrows 
during low transitory income (Diagne et al., 2000). Diagne, further indicate that indirect 
approach assumes with diminishing marginal utility, in the lack of access and demand 
constraints((Diagne et al., 2000)). Several studies such as Paulson and Townsend ((Paulson and 
Townsend, 2001) and Guiso (Guiso, 1998); cited by Love & Sanchez), have been conducted 
using these method.  
Direct approach is the methodology used in this thesis. This method captures information 
directly from the households by interviewing them. The practice of direct approach solves the 
problem with disequilibrium models, while a problem arises with quantifying the level of credit 
constraints of the households in question (Love and Sánchez, 2009).  The qualitative nature of 
the data makes it challenging to measure to which extent the households are credit constrained. 
The questionnaires in the ESS ask whether a household has applied for and received credit. This 
does not answer if the households demand for credit was fully or partially met. It is thus difficult 
to conclude if households that have received loans are not credit constrained, as they can be 





ESS survey contributes to study the extent of credit constraints and the overall demand. Using 
the responses to different questions, the identification of divers household are analyzed. This 
identification occurs by first observing household that have applied and those who did not. First, 
we study the reasoning for not applying. In this case there were household that respond to not 
having the need for credit. In addition, household that were discouraged to apply (potential 
borrowers) were found. Second, for those household that applied, the responded were 
categorized as received and rejected. Overall, household are categorized in four groups; no 
demand, discouraged (credit constraints), received and rejected (credit constraints).  
No demand:  The decision to apply depends on whether the household member has a demand 
for credit or not. Household in no demand category have not applied. This group contains of 
household with the following respond from ESS; 1) Have an adequate farm.  
All other reasoning for not applying is summarized to identify the second and (discouraged) 
credit constrained group. This group are detached from overall household that did not apply 
based on their answer that were discouragement. Household in this category is defined as credit 
constrained, since they indicate to have demand but also were discouraged to apply. Several of 
the respond from discouraged (credit constrained) household indicate to have inadequate 
information on procedure of credit application. The lack of knowledge on how and who to 
approach to, hinders portion of credit constrained household from applying. These might arise 
as result of absence of local lenders. Meaning lenders are not positioned closer to household. 
In addition, that household perceive the cost of expected default to be higher than the benefit 
of the loan, might rise discouragement. The risk of losing collateral such as house or other 
valuable asset can be viewed as less esteemed then the benefits occurring through loan. 
Perception of not being creditworthy by lenders are another barrier that prevents household 
from demanding credit. These can occur as result of having inadequate collateral and by fear of 
rejection. 
Third group contains all household that applied and received. While the fourth group identifies 
household that applied but were rejected. This group are also consider as credit constrained. 
Henceforward, credit constrained group are merged representative of household that did not 
apply because of discouragement and those that applied and were rejected. By such 
classification, the regression analysis of participation in loan market focuses on three outcome. 
First outcome, present household with no need for credit (no demand). Second outcome, 
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contains household that were credit constrained. Outcome represents household that received 
credit. In addition, presentation of lenders are distinguished as formal and informal. For the 
regression analysis, the probit regression with sample selection model is applied.  
For the descriptive analysis household are divided in two, where they are categorized based on 
their request for loan. For the respond no, the options are divide by no demand and discouraged. 
Those who answered yes were further grouped based on which institution they received credit 
from as, formal and informal.  
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3.4 The Model: 
The focus of the following section turns towards understanding the conditions surrounding 
supply and demand of credit in the dataset provided for this study. In order to comprehend what 
role the various variables play in determining who becomes credit constrained a binary model 
is constructed. Following in Love & Sanchez (Love and Sánchez, 2009) footsteps the study of 
formal and informal market is implemented separately at first. Then, the model was further 
implemented on the combined (formal and informal) data.   
For this study, the model chosen is bivariate probit regression with sample selection. This model 
have been used in other research such as Kapland and Venezeky(Kaplan and Venezky, 1994). 
Sample selection is reported to refers to sample not randomly selected ((Guo and Fraser, 2014), 
chapter 4, page 85-125). The correct solution for problem of selection bias is reported to 
originate from Heckman`s two-stage estimation in 1979(Kaplan and Venezky, 1994). In his 
work from 1979 example are provided on how selection bias can be correctly approached 
(Heckman, 1979).  
Maximum likelihood present log-likelihood functions in its estimations. Besides, maximum 
likelihood were also reported to be more robust conducting the two-stage estimation (Greene 
and Hensher, 2010, Greene and Hensher, 2008). By such reasoning, these study performer’s 
maximum likelihood estimation. Bivariate probit regression with sample selectin is estimated 
in Stata by heckprobit as maximum likelihood procedure. Within this estimation, Stata presents 
goodness-of-fit measurements in form of Rho, Sigma and lamda. Rho contains estimation of 
correlation of the residuals in the two equation. Sigma estimates the standard error of residuals. 
Lambda here is the result of sigma multiplied by rho and it also contains the inverse mills ratio 
((Menu) Stata).  
By the use of bivariate probit regression with sample selection, the procedure is divide into 
demand and access estimation with binary variables (0/1). Demand and access equations are 
estimated jointly for this research (Love and Sánchez, 2009). This was done in two main 
increments. The parameters are estimated by the likelihood method, using bivariate Probit 
model with sample selection. The first stage of this process determinates whether there is 
demand for credit in a household exists or not. Equation 1 assigns a binary value to a household 
depending on the demand for credit. In addition, it is used to control the endogenous self-
selection procedure in determining demand for credit and contains also probability prediction 
through probit model (Love and Sánchez, 2009).   The second part of the process evaluates the 
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access for credit provided there is demand for credit. Households with no demand for credit are 
left out based on the binary values assigned in step one (i.e. equation 1). Equation 2, also known 
as the access equation is applied to the rest of the households. Here the lenders decide whether 
to approve the loan application or not. Further, inverse Mills ratio (IMS) is included as 
regression for the estimation (Kaplan and Venezky, 1994).   
Sampling law:           𝑦𝐷 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑖𝑓 𝐷 > 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 
                                   𝑦𝐴  𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑓 𝐷 = 1  




Φ is the density normal function,  
ɸ is cumulative normal functions 
𝑦𝐷 = 𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑, 𝑦𝐴 = 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 
 
The sample passed through the access equation in step 2 is no longer randomly selected since 
the only households included are the households with the right (1) binary values (demand 
credit). This makes the data to be “selected” by systematic process (Kaplan and Venezky, 1994) 
Bivariate sample selection account for this problem, where first probit model is estimated for 
explaining if household are demanding and not. Further, least square regression is estimated 
relating household with demand to explanatory variables and inverse Mills ratio (Kaplan and 
Venezky, 1994). Inverse Mills ration (IMR) is expected to be further modified the access 
equation (2), giving sample regression function through estimation of covariance divided by 
variance of the demand (Kaplan and Venezky, 1994). The role of IMR as to fulfil the 
assumption of zero in the conditional mean of error, so the estimation not end up as bias (Kaplan 







Selectivity:                        [𝜇𝐷 , 𝜇𝐴]~𝑁2[0,0,1,1, 𝜌𝜇𝐷,𝜇𝐴] 





𝜇𝑖 = 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑       𝜎𝑖
2 = 1        
Error term in these two equations are assumed to have jointly normal distribution(Kaplan and 
Venezky, 1994).  Since only the sign of demand is observed and 𝜎 is unknown, the 
normalization 𝜎𝑖
2=1 is used (Beyene, 2014). If 𝜎𝑖
2 = 0 the error terms in demand and access 
equation are not correlated.  
 
 
f(y)D={0 if D<0 |1 if   D≥0  ,                         f(y)A={0, if A<0 |1 if   A≥0 
 
(1)          𝑦𝐷= β1xD+β2ZD+μD 
(2)                𝑦𝐴= β1xA+ μA 




Equation (1) indicate the demand function, while equation (2) present the access. Identification 
requires, there should be at least one variable included in the demand equation, but not in the 
access equation (Beyene, 2014). For this study, Z from equation (1) explains the framework for 
the “additional variable”   From the equation (1) X refers to explanatory variable and  𝜇𝑖 is 
disturbance term. Diverse variable categories elaborates to control for household heterogeneity.  
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3.5 Variables: Description   
This section describes, the variables used in the estimation of the demand and access equation 
are described. These variables are categorized in four groups, namely: household 
characteristics; household head (personal) characteristics; demographic; and additional 
variable (demand identification). The last mentioned variable is only to be found in the 
demand equation. In appendix C, table c.3 shows the list of all the variables along with their 
mean and standard deviation.        
The first group of variable set includes household characteristic. Such characteristics contain 
variables such as size of household (in term of how many members’ lives in the household). A 
variable that depends on the size of a household may affect the consumption or income of the 
household. If the Size of a household is small, it may indicates less consumption or income and 
vice-verse. Number of children accounts for the expenses related to having children. It may also 
lead to increased income as a result of increase in the working force of the family.  That in turn 
could affect the households chance of getting a loan. Numbers of adult are also consider by 
assumption as income resource and also the expense that occurs with it. 
Second set of variables contains personal characteristic of the “head” of the household that may 
influence the demand and supply of credit. Education can be used to reflect the ability of the 
head of the household and their expected future income as mentioned by Ibrahim (Ibrahim et 
al., 2007). For head of a household that have not had access to education the 
assumption/literature indicate that formal lenders might view this as barrier. Gender in 
developing countries is thought to affect through the barriers of lacking network and 
discrimination. Moreover, characteristics such as owning non-agriculture enterprise and 
owning house are also included. These could estimate the value of owning asset on demanding 
and receiving of credit.  
To capture the difference economic condition through the region, we include all eleven regions. 
This can be used to estimate how different region are “equipped” to meet the demand and supply 
of credit of its residents. Furthermore, it could give valuable information on how the local credit 




“Additional variable” are assumed only to entre in the selection equation. This assumption is 
based on some characteristic that are unobserved by the lenders, but are likely to correlate with 
demand (Love and Sánchez, 2009). Since this identification is unobservable to the lenders, it is 
assumed to not affect the lenders decision on granting or denying the loan. For these additional 
explanatory variables, we consider possible reasons for applying for loan, such as adverse 
occasions. The identification focuses on such outcomes as death or illness of member of 
household, loss of income, climate change (such as drought), price change on commodity, 
shock or accident on member of the household and other outcomes that increase the demand 
for loan. Mentioned indicators in the additional variable might in general increases the need for 






In this chapter the results found for the formal market and the informal markets are presented 
separately, followed by the overall performance on determinants of credit constrained for both 
markets combined. The descriptive analysis follows the questionnaires raised from the survey. 
Meaning, it describes the decision household have taken based on the respond from the 
questionnaires. Whereas if household do have demand, were the credit received from formal or 
informal? In addition, it considers also household with no need for credit and those who are 
discouraged to borrow. The result from bivariate Probit model with sample selection in reported 
in table 4.4, 4.6 & 4.7.         
 
4.2 Lenders 
The ESS data set contains information about who the surveyed households approached for loans 
in the credit markets. The data available gives a detailed account of the institutions and parties 
the various households had the opportunity to ask. The results are presented in figure 4.1.The 
survey indicate credit constraints to occur more in formal rather than informal. From the formal 
lenders except for micro finance the incidence of credit constraint among lenders neutrally 
consist. The same occur for the informal lender also, with exception for neighbor and relatives. 
These incidence might indicate that microfinance, neighbor and relatives to be easily 
approached and located in accessible areas for the households. 
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Figure 4-1 Source of credit 
 
Source: authors calculation form ESS 2013 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the lenders of those 1 333 credit across the country. As mentioned earlier the 
credit market operates with formal and informal lenders. Informal suppliers cover 60 percent 
of the transaction, while formal lenders cover the remaining 40 percent. From the formal 
lenders, microfinance institutions are found to be the highest distributer of credit, (with 29 
percent). This result confirm the great role microfinance institutions play in inclusion of the 
broad population in to the financial markets. Second largest formal creditors are Commercial 
Bank of Ethiopia. While approaching the NGOs for a loan ranks in third place. For the informal 
lenders most of credit transaction arises between households and relative. Meaning, the largest 
distributer of informal credit is relative. Besides loans from a relative, money transactions 
between neighbors are also reported to be following highest distributer of informal credit. Local 
merchant, moneylender, employer and other non-governmental lender, (respectively) present 
the rest of creditor from informal institution.       
There can be several reasons for approaching one of the creditors than the other. The preference 
of some lenders ahead of others can be explained by for instance the accessibility of the lender, 









Institution demand application was made for
Institution demand application was made for
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borrowing might occur as consumption smoothing, investment or covering an adverse event. 
Preference can indicate the personal relation and the access one have towards these institutions.        
 
4.3 Borrowers: 
Borrowers consists of those whom receive valuable assents on agreement or promise on paying 
the borrowed amount back in given time and cost related (Kon and Storey, 2003, Hodgman, 
1960). Households are separated as credit borrowers and non-borrowers. ESS provides also 
some information on why the borrowers enter and remain away from the loan market. Figure 
4.2 presents the summative result for non-borrowing households.    
Figure 4-2 Reasons for not borrowing 
 
Source: authors calculation form ESS 2013 
The aggregate result includes also household with no need for credit. The sum of household 
with no need for credit represent small fraction of the households that participated in the ESS 
survey. Household with such position respond to be relying on their own resources. Overall, 
household with such reasoning and discourage to borrow are viewed as non-borrowers. 
Further, the discourage household are consider to be credit constrained, as mentioned in the 
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Figure 4-3 Reason for borrowing 
 
Source: authors calculation form ESS 2013 
The various reasons the borrower’s asked for credit is portrayed in figure 4.3. The borrowers 
mostly require credit as start-up capital for opening businesses. These might be partially 
explained by the countries large agriculture activity and need of inputs to effectives the 
productivity(Dercon and Hill, 2009). The second most frequent reason for a borrower to 
approach a lender is for consumption of agricultural input for food crops. Expanding business 
is also another motive that raise the demand for credit. Other (specify) from figure 4.3 includes 
the need for credit, to purchase oxen for farming, household consumption, construction of a 
house and to start livestock fattening. The rest are covered by borrower with the need for 
consumption of inputs for other crops, purchase of non-farm inputs and purchase of house or 






























Figure 4-4 Distribution of credit in formal and informal market across Ethiopia 
 














The focus of this section shifts towards the results obtained from the data about the formal credit 
markets. As mentioned earlier formal institution for this study contains microfinance, 
Commercial banks and NGO`s. Characteristics that affect borrower and formal lenders are 
studied closer. The following issues are the core problems discussed further. Which features do 
borrowers demanding from formal institutions have? What kind of borrowers are credit 
constrained from these formal institutions? Which features increase the likelihood of receiving 
credit form formal lenders?     
4.4.1 Who demands? 
The number of people in a given household is referred to as the household size. A given 
household can have several adult members besides the household head. The size of a household 
is not statically significant in the result achieved by the regression. The study of the descriptive 
estimation on size is reported in table 4.4. Table 4.4, presents subgroups household size and the 
result associated with variable of size. The purpose of such groupings are to provide information 
on the effect household dimension have on the probability of the approval of their application 
for credit.    
 
Table 4-1 Subgroups of household family size 
Have you borrowed on credit? Total 
Yes No 
 Formal Informal No need Discouraged   
Size: 1-2 7 % 14 % 11 % 68 % 980 
Size: 3-4 9 % 16 % 10 % 65 % 1442 
Size: 5-6 12 % 16 % 9 % 63 % 1373 
Size: 7-8 15 % 15 % 9 % 61% 912 
Size: 9 and 
above 
12 % 15% 10 % 63% 458 
Total  534 799 515 3318 5165 
Source: author’s calculation by the use of ESS.  
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Households with 3-4 and 5-6 member’s accounts for over half of the share in the data set by 
representation of 28% and 27 % respectively. Meaning, most of the participators in ESS have 
3 to 6 family member living in one household.  The data indicates that 7-8 family members to 
receives more credit from the formal institutions than the others. The larger group that 
contains higher probability of being credit constrain though discouragement are those with 
small (1-2) sized household.  
The data presented on table 4.4 shows also that demand for credit is somewhat proportional 
with the number of members in a household. Meaning, small sized household are the once 
with the least demand for credit from the formal market. Furthermore, the smallest households 
are the most discouraged from approaching the loan market for credit.  For the formal market 
higher probability of receiving occurs for household with large member. Small sized family 
member appears to receive more from informal market.   
Personal characteristics such as the following variables determinants the likelihood of a 
household demanding credit in the formal institutions.  
Male demand 12.9 percent more from formal market than women according to the regression 
analyze.  
Households lacking in educated tend to have statically higher probability of demanding from 
the formal institutions. 
Likelihood of households demanding capital in formal markets decrease for the household 
that do not own their house. Owning non-agricultural enterprise and owning a house, are 
variables that affect the demand in this sector. Collateral can be partial explanation of this 
incident.     
Age indicate reduced demand from younger (under 29) and older (above 60) participators. 
Middle-age “head” are likely to demand credit in formal market by 13.6%.  
The statistical analysis undertaken in this study shows there are major variations between the 
regional states. There is statistical significance in the regional states of Tigray and SNNP. In 
aforementioned states there tends to be a higher demand for credit from the formal sector, while 
the opposite is true in the capital city Addis Ababa, Afar and Harari regions. Moreover the 
descriptive analysis revels that Somalia and Gambela are also less likely to demand from formal 
creditors. Participators from these two areas were not able to receive any credit from the formal 
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market.  On the other hand, the Amhara and Oromia regions appear to have higher demand 
from the formal market when the descriptive analysis is examined.  
In Ethiopia large proportion of the population depend immensely on agricultural outcome for 
their economic safety and wellbeing. This often leads to an increase in demand for credit as a 
result of unpredictable climate change, commodity price and other shocks and accidents in the 
economy overall. Droughts and deregulation have become more frequent due to climate change. 
This in turn leads to an increased need of financial services such as loan and insurance markets.  
The probability of demanding credit increases as a result of that. Further, adverse event such as 
price change on commodity items and accident occurring on one of the household members 
increases the likelihood of demand in both formal markets and also informal markets.       
4.4.2 Who is credit constrained:  
Households that lack collateral are according to regression discriminated by the formal credit 
markets. Such households often lack houses, ownership of enterprises, and tend to have higher 
likelihood of being credit constrained. Households that lack future plans of opening business 
enterprises are also credit constrained in the formal credit markets. Participators that rents out  
house are less likely to demand credit. In addition, those who own their house have higher 
probability of being less credit constrained.  
Gender inequality plays great role in Ethiopia in many aspects.  This effect is also found in the 
formal credit market according to the data analysis performed in this study. Household with 
female head are often discriminated and more likely to be credit constrained in the formal 
market. Household with female heads have 19 percent higher likelihood of being credit 
constrained in the formal markets.  
Another variable that affects ones chances of inclusion in the formal credit market is age.  Age 
has a negative effect on the incidences of credit constraints. These can be interpreted as the 
middle age participator of being less credit constrained with inverted u-shape in the formal 
institutions. Participators in the end of this inverted u-shape are more likely to be credit 
constrained. Meaning, younger and old head of household are more likely to be credit 
constrained.  
The level of education the head of the household has received is another factor that affects the 
demand for credit. In this thesis the base of no education includes illiterate and informally 
educated household heads. Compared to head without education, educated household head 
demand less credit from the formal institution.  
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For the explanation of credit constrained household characteristics such as size and number of 
children, were not found statically significant. However, household with small number of 
members have higher likelihood of being credit constrained, shown from the descriptive 
analyze in table 4.3.    
Without any prior criterion, Tigray were chosen as the base for treatment of region variables. 
Compared to Tigray, residence in Harari, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have significantly 
demand of credit from the formal institution. There is non-significant disparity in the remaining 
regions demanding of credit. All regions are statically credit constrained when Tigray is 
omitted. In addition, the surprise insignificant value is found in Gambela and Harari, which 
were found to be caused by none-existing formal institution in these two regional states. These 
result were achieved through descriptive calculation for regions, it is founded in table 5.5.  
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Table 4-2 Demographic dispersion of credit 
Have you borrowed on credit? 
Yes No 
 Formal Informal No need Discouraged  
Tigray 28 % 12 % 9 %  51 % 
Afar 0.80 % 12 % 19 % 68.2 %  
Amhara 16 %  17 %  10 % 57 % 
Oromia 11 % 14 % 8 % 67 % 
Somalie 0 % 18 % 8 % 74 % 
Benshangul 
Gumzu 
5  % 14 % 13 % 68 % 
SNNP 7 % 16 % 6 % 71 % 
Gambelia 2 % 18 % 10 % 70 %  
Harari 0 % 13 % 27 % 60 % 
Addis Ababa 2 % 7 % 23 % 68 % 
Dire Dawa 6 % 17 % 13 % 64 % 
Total 10 % 16 % 10 % 64 % 
Source: author’s calculation from ESS  
The data set specifies the difference in distribution credit through all of the eleven regions. 
Table 4.5 displays how the dispersion appears across the country.  
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4.4.3 Who receive? 
Features associated with the likelihood of being able to receive credit from formal lenders are: 
Middle-age participators are more likely to receive a loan in the formal markets than the 
younger and older applicants are. It can be their future expectation and to smooth the barriers 
to get capital for starting up of diverse businesses plans.  
Those who approach the credit markets with this strategy have increased the probability of 
getting credit from formal market.  
The ownership of a house increases the probability of receiving a loan from the formal markets, 
provided the house presented as collateral. In addition, it can create positive perception of the 
borrowers. The probability of getting credit increases by 32.2 % for household with their own 
houses. Owning asset may explained as risk adjustment system implied by the formal 
institution.   
Male participators are more likely of getting credit in formal market.  
The level of education obtained by the head of the household did not affect the probability of 
getting credit. Meaning, the formal institution provides credit for household heads that have 
illiterate and primary education. These can be clarify by some formal market (especially 
microfinance) servicing resident that are more vulnerable.  
To clarify the descriptive and econometric relationship between age and credit, age of the head 
and its square is used as explanatory variables. Table 4.3 shows composition of borrower’s 
choice based on given group-age of the head.  
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Table 4-3 Age dispersion of credit 




 Formal Informal No need Discouraged  
1 ( under 
29) 
5 % 16 % 11 % 68 % 947 
2 (30-44 
age) 
11 % 17 % 9 % 63 % 1952 
3 (45-59 
age) 
12 % 14 % 10 % 64 % 1281 
4 ( above 
60) 
10% 15 % 11 % 64 % 985 
Source: author’s calculation from ESS 2013 
  
Initially, the middle age household head have the higher benefit of receiving credit in formal 
institution. From Table 4.3, it can be observed that the majority of household heads are middle 
aged. Totally the group of individuals under 29 are lowest represented and those who receive 
the least. Further, the variation contribute an overview of vulnerability to be found in each age 
group encounter with credit market. The youngest participators are according to presented table 
most exposed of being credit constrained form formal institution.  
 
The descriptive analyze contribute further explanation occurring in different regions. Residence 






4.4.4 The results of regression analysis for the formal sector 
Table 4.4: Regression result for formal sector   
   ML-estimation      
     Formal 
     Demand Credit constrained Received 
     Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
          
Household characteristics         
Numbers of childeren  0,201 0,728 0,006 0,848 -0,034 0,485 
Numbers of adults   -0,002 0,967 0,022 0,557 -0,055 0,272 
(Household size)   -0,0107 0,853 -0,028 0,451 0,069 0,145 
          
Personal characteristics        
Age    0,014 0,136 -0,008 0,191 0,025 0,022 
Age square/100   -0,015 0,09 0,008 0,192 -0,022 0,031 
Gender (male)   -0,124 0,028 -0,192 0 0,287 0,000 
Own non-agric entrepr.  -0,107 0,145 -0,165 0,004 0,083 0,306 
Education   -0,168 0,002 -0,033 0,322 -0,034 0,553 
Plan to open business  -0,057 0,32 -0,212 0 0,142 0,016 
Owning a house/dwelling  -0,177 0,078 -0,182 0,01 0,321 0,004 
Regional characteristics        
          
Afar    -0,589 0,000 0,482 0,000 -1,781 0,000 
Amhara    -0,04 0,664 0,145 0,022 -0,399 0,000 
Oromia    0,075 0,421 0,452 0,000 -0,673 0,000 
Somalie    -0,143 0,315 0,66 0,000 -7,721 1 
Benshagul Gumuz   -0,166 0,307 0,535 0,000 -1,13 0,000 
SNNP    0,259 0,008 0,582 0,000 -0,961 0,000 
Gambelia    0,017 0,922 0,542 0,000 -1,481 0,000 
Harari    -0,782 0,000 0,232 0,040 -7,96 1 
Addis Ababa   -0,649 0,000 0,38 0,000 -1,128 0,000 
Dire Dawa   -0,268 0,051 0,382 0,001 -0,925 0,000 
 
Demand identification         
Death or illness   0,099 0,421     
Loss of income   0,53 0,249     
Affected by climatic events  0,265 0,002     
Price change on food  0,269 0,006     
Shock/accicdent   0,225 0,003     
Other     0,096 0,592     
constant    1,364 0,000 0,649 0 -1,647 0 
Significant at * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10% 
Wald chi2(21)=246 with prob > chi2=0.000, rho= -0.304, atrho=-0.314, LR test chi2(1)= 0.80 with 
prob > chi2=0.369 
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4.5 Informal  
4.5.1 Who demands?  
Households with educated heads appear to demand more credit from informal market than the 
other groups. Educated head are 16 percent more likely to demand credits than their 
counterpart that are not educated. Male participators demand by 12 percent more than female.  
For the regional fragment holding Tigray as the base, several more areas demand credit from 
informal institution. Afar, SNNP, Addis Ababa and Harari have significantly higher 
probability for demanding from informal. The lack of formal institution in Gambella and 
Harari increases the probability of demand in informal institution. These is also shown in the 
descriptive analysis of region in table 4.2.  
Table 4-5 Descriptive analyze of gender and education for head of households 
Have you borrowed on credit? 
Yes No 
 Formal Informal No need Discouraged  
Female 7 % 15 % 9 % 69 % 
Male 12 % 16 % 10 %  62 % 
No education 12 % 16 % 8 % 64 % 
Primary 10 % 16 % 9 % 65 % 
Secondary 6 % 16 % 14 % 64 % 
Degree/certificates 7 % 14 % 16 % 63 % 
Source: author’s calculation from ESS 2013 
 
The gender based description is provided by table 4.7.  It describe that 70 % of participation 
to be male. Remaining 30 % are covered by female, accounting for 1 568 participators. These 
might indicate female to be more vulnerable than their male counter parts. Almost double as 
many male receive credit from formal institution than their female counterpart. The difference 
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in informal market is less as shown in the table 5.7. In total female head can be seen as of 
being more credit constrained. 
4.5.2 Who is credit constrained: 
Female are about 19 percent more likely to be credit constrained in informal market. Love & 
Sanchez clarify this occurrence by the traditional and cultural barriers that might be occurring 
in developing economy.   
The probability of being credit constrained increases where asset such as house are rented and 
not owned by the head of household. Household that rent a house are about 12 percent more 
likely to be credit constrained in the informal market. These resemble with household that 
own non-agriculture enterprise. Owning your own business decreases the likelihood of being 
credit constrained. Plan to open business decreases the occurrence of being credit constrained 
in both formal and informal lenders decision. 
The propensity of being credit constrained in other region than Tigray are high according to 
the regression. These outcomes are the same both for formal and informal market.  
4.5.3 Who receive? 
Household that borrows from informal have such characteristic:  
The level of education of the household head leads to increase in the probability of getting 
credit from informal by 8 %. This indicates that education have a financial value in the society 
(meaning they consider those with education as more “reliable”). Also it can be measured as 
future proxy in this market as Ibrahim reported (Ibrahim et al., 2007).  
Male are more likely to receive a loan in the informal market than female. This incidence 
occurs in both markets and it is also that they are less credit constrained.  
Economical strategy such as owning non-agriculture enterprise and plan to open business 
increases the likelihood of receiving credit.  
The availability of credit in the informal market varies considerably in the various regional 
states. There are far more regions that have significantly high probability of receiving credit 
from informal institution. Residents in regions such as Afar, Amhara, Harari, Addis Ababa 
and Dire Dawa are more likely to get credit from the informal market than their peers in other 
regions. 
From the “additional variable” the same variables as found for formal; climate change, price 
change and shock or accident, increases the likelihood of receiving credit.  
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4.5.4 The results of regression analysis for the informal sector 
Table 4.6: Regression result for informal sector   
   ML-estimation      
     Informal 
     Demand Credit constrained Received 
     Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
          
Household characteristics         
Numbers of childeren  0,007 0,91 0,0103 0,801 0,014 0,74 
Numbers of adults   -0,018 0,775 0,024 0,56 0,003 0,934 
(Household size)   0,006 0,918 -0,319 0,427 -0,007 0,856 
          
Personal characteristics        
Age    0,0111 0,227 -0,009 0,186 -0,001 0,88 
Age square/100   -0,013 0,141 0,009 0,182 0,0008 0,913 
Gender (male)   -0,153 0,005 -0,198 0,000 0,091 0,032 
Own non-agric entrepr.  -0,099 0,156 -0,175 0,002 0,167 0,004 
Education   -0,172 0,001 -0,045 0,254 0,085 0,04 
Plan to open business  -0,06 0,281 -0,226 0,000 0,18 0,000 
Owning a house/dwelling  -0,121 0,211 -0,189 0,009 0,067 0,373 
Regional characteristics        
          
Afar    -0,61 0,000 0,503 0,000 0,223 0,089 
Amhara    -0,045 0,616 0,147 0,024 0,15 0,033 
Oromia    0,059 0,522 0,456 0,000 -0,055 0,44 
Somalie    -0,073 0,587 0,653 0,000 0,111 0,262 
Benshagul Gumuz   -0,16 0,319 0,547 0,000 0,1004 0,451 
SNNP    0,214 0,026 0,602 0,000 -0,069 0,328 
Gambelia    0,015 0,932 0,552 0,000 0,125 0,362 
Harari    -0,796 0,000 0,226 0,053 0,444 0,000 
Addis Ababa   -0,618 0,000 0,375 0,000 0,187 0,06 
Dire Dawa   -0,262 0,046 0,353 0,001 0,168 0,109 
 
Demand identification         
Death or illness   0,061 0,575     
Loss of income   0,501 0,279     
Affected by climatic events  0,332 0,000     
Price change on food  0,172 0,053     
Shock/accicdent   0,174 0,001     
Other     0,148 0,331     
constant    1,415 0,000 0,68 0 -0,944 0,000 
Significant at * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10% 





For the overall regression on household demanding credit, following characteristics gave 
significant result: 
The formal and informal markets combined appear to prefer male borrower to female borrower. 
Male household heads are more likely to demand credit than their female counterparts are. The 
probability of demanding credit is 12 present higher in favor of the male-headed households.  
In general, the result indicates also that female household heads are more likely to be credit 
constrained than their male compatriots are. The female-headed households are 19.7 % more 
credit constrained than the male-headed ones. 
Household without educated “head” demands more than those with educational background in 
the overall credit market (combined informal and formal markets). Household heads without 
education are 16.9 %   likely to demand credit.  
Household that own house have 17.5 percentage higher probability of demanding loan than 
those renting a house. These could be explained as collateral or asset for the lenders. Moreover, 
household that do not own (non-agricultural) enterprise or business are also likely to be credit 
constrained in the overall market. Household that do not intend to open business are also 15 % 
more likely to be credit constrained. 
The age of the household head plays a vital role in determining the credit worthiness of a 
household. Household with non-middle aged head have higher probability of being credit 
constrained.     
When Tigray is kept as the base, the demand for credit has more varieties across the regional 
states. Afar, SNNP, Harari, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa have significantly higher probability 
of demanding credit than other regions in general, whereas SNNP region appears to demand 
more than other regions. It is also, where most of borrowers originate from according to the 
ESS.  
Holding Tigray omitted, the total result presents that the rest of regions to be credit 
constrained. These can partially be explained by the existence of high supplier of formal 
institution in Tigray relative to the rest of the regions. Similar results were also found in 
Ibrahim’s studies.  
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In general adverse events that occur as result of climate change, price change on commodity 
and shocks or accidents on one of household members increases demand for credit. The 
increased demand in the aforementioned grouped could be understood as strategy to cope with 
the mentioned adverse event.   
4.6.2 Received general character 
Characteristics that seems to increase the likelihood of receiving credit in the overall markets 
are age, gender, owning non-farm enterprise, owning a house and plan to open business.  
Male “head” is 20 % more likely to receive credit than their female counterpart is. Household 
that either own their own house and non-agricultural enterprise have 18.6 % and 16.9 % 
respectively higher probability to get credit. Middle-aged household heads have higher 
propensity of receiving credit.  
The descriptive result on region shows large distribution of credit occurring in Tigray, similar 
to the result achieved by the regression. Tigray region being omitted the result shows less 
probability of getting loan in other regions. Like mentioned earlier also, Ibrahim found similar 
when it comes to analysis of region and specially Tigray. 
Totally discouraged household covers higher portion of the resident in general. Household from 
Tigray, Amhara and Addis Ababa appears to be less discouraged by 51, 57 & 60 percent 
respectively. However, household in region such as Somalia, SNNP & Gambelia have highest 
probability of being discouraged with 74, 71 & 70 percentage. One of the explanation have 
been the accessibility of creditors(Love and Sánchez, 2009). The distribution of credit in formal 
and informal institution states also great dispersion in granting a loan.  The region variables 
indicate that most of formal transaction to occur in Tigray region. These is further support by 
finding of Degefe, where he stated that 72 % of formal service occurring in Tigray. Afar have 
also indicate to have a low rate of coverage from formal institution. 
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4.6.3 The results of regression analysis for the overall financial sector 
Table 4.7: Regression result in the overall credit markets   
   ML-estimation      
     General 
     Demand Credit constrained Received 
     Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
          
Household characteristics         
Numbers of childeren  0,009 0,87 0,003 0,941 -0,002 0,954 
Numbers of adults   -0,013 0,834 0,025 0,554 -0,025 0,545 
(Household size)   -0,0001 0,989 -0,029 0,453 0,031 0,446 
          
Personal characteristics        
Age    0,012 0,189 -0,012 0,11 0,013 0,099 
Age square/100   -0,014 0,123 0,012 0,106 -0,013 0,099 
Gender (male)   -0,143 0,012 -0,197 0,000 0,2001 0 
Own non-agric entrepr.  -0,112 0,128 -0,169 0,004 0,169 0,004 
Education   -0,166 0,002 -0,021 0,612 0,025 0,56 
Plan to open business  -0,053 0,351 -0,236 0,000 0,236 0 
Owning a house/dwelling  -0,166 0,100 -0,186 0,015 0,186 0,015 
Regional characteristics        
          
Afar    -0,566 0,000 0,651 0,000 -0,653 0,000 
Amhara    -0,024 0,789 0,158 0,018 -0,156 0,020 
Oromia    0,092 0,323 0,468 0,000 -0,47 0,000 
Somalie    -0,085 0,548 0,701 0,000 -0,704 0,000 
Benshagul Gumuz   -0,15 0,355 0,585 0,000 -0,587 0,000 
SNNP    0,264 0,006 0,591 0,000 -0,593 0,000 
Gambelia    0,051 0,778 0,558 0,000 -0,559 0,000 
Harari    -0,768 0,000 0,463 0,005 -0,467 0,004 
Addis Ababa   -0,632 0,000 0,615 0,000 -0,617 0,000 
Dire Dawa   -0,243 0,074 0,419 0,000 -0,421 0,000 
 
Demand identification         
Death or illness   0,078 0,509     
Loss of income   0,601 0,185     
Affected by climatic events  0,346 0,000     
Price change on food  0,221 0,021     
Shock/accicdent   0,204 0,004     
Other     0,171 0,301     
constant    1,386 0,000 0,729 0 -0,745 0,000 
Significant at * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10% 
Wald chi2(1)= 191.04 with prob > chi(21)= 0.000 ,athrho= -0.987, rho= -0.756, LR test: chi2(1)= 




5.1 Discussion  
The determinants of credit constraints in Ethiopia were analyzed and investigated by the use of 
regression and descriptive calculation on the ESS survey. This study has found several factors 
affecting the various households’ access to credit in both the formal and informal sector. 
Gender, age, education level, properties of the head of household and the regional state the 
household reside in are among the variables that affect the chance of a household getting a loan 
plication approved. Female, young, small sized family of 1-3, not owning enterprise (business), 
not owning house, not having plan to open business and residence in Gambella, Afar and 
Somalie are typically related to being credit constrained. On the other hand, household with 
features such as male, owning enterprise, family size of 3-9, plan to open business, not educated 
and are residence in Tigray, Amhara or Oromia have higher probability of receiving credit.  
 
Among others reason discouragement from applying for credit have held large portion of the 
population out of the credit market. Initiated by the process explained in achieving credit can 
credit constrained occur as self-selection out of credit market (Love and Sánchez, 2009). 
Moreover, the access to credit was divided using the source of credit formal and informal 
institution. Surprisingly regional areas played a role in affecting the probability of getting credit, 
based on accessibility and service provide for their residence. Meaning in some regions the 
existence of formal market are broader than other areas. Non-existence of formal credit market 
affects the approach the borrowers have towards the market. Limited access to the formal credit 
market might leave unmet demand for credit in several household. Such incidence has been 
reported to emerge as result of lack in agreement matching households need (Love and Sánchez, 
2009). Different variables appear to be determinants credit constrained household in formal and 
informal sectors. Credit constrained household account for large portion of the population.  The 
share of household taking informal loans are higher than the portion borrowing from formal. 
Duo to features as fragile demand for credit, the participation rate in credit market are portrayed 
to be low. The interaction between lenders and borrowers have be reported to have positive 
indication for receiving loan by Love & Sánchez (Love and Sánchez, 2009). Access of financial 
suppliers in the region might affect the transaction of formal credit among other by reduction 
of transaction cost. The affect might appears as physical approach and interaction of formal 
creditors (Fichera, 2010).  
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The result further indicate household that have higher probability of demanding credit, also 
have higher likelihood of being credit constrained. Love & Sanchez (Love and Sánchez, 2009) 
also found similar result. This result appears as conflict on counter to what intuition would lead 
one to expect(Love and Sánchez, 2009). Love and Sanchez (2009) states first explanation to be 
that the amount receive and predicted proportion of credit attainment in both market being very 
low as the cause. Secondly, variables included in the model can differ from what the lenders 
use to base their decision on, some unobservable factors not captured by these variables(Love 
and Sánchez, 2009).   
Household with asset such as owning house and enterprise are found to be less credit 
constrained, which also consists with the literature. Household that owns a house seems to 
demand loan from formal market, and have higher probabilities to get their demands met from 
the formal market as presented in the result chapter. Net wealth is stated as a tool for 
measurement of current and future proxy (Ibrahim et al., 2007, Crook, 2006) . This clarification 
can affect the determinants of credit constraints. Owning asset might be explained as risk 
adjustment system implied by the formal institutions(Love and Sánchez, 2009).       
Age is one of the variables where the effect can have different outcome and implications. In 
formal market, younger participator had higher probability of being constrained. In other words, 
participators over 30 years and under 60 were more favored. However, Tang (Tang et al., 2010) 
reported that older head to benefit more based on their established social network and capital. 
Younger participator can be categories as more risky customers; while the “older” can be 
perceived to have established credit history and collateral. Degefe reports MFIs in Ethiopia to 
mainly serve households that are between age of 18 and 59, leaving participators above age of 
60 out of the credit market (Obo, 2009).  
The informal market had no emphasis on age. Nevertheless, Kochar (Yusuf Ibrahim Kofarmata, 
6.10.2016)) explains that the probability of older had to demand loan in informal market 
increase as a result of lacking members undertake income. Nwara, found similar correlations 
between age and credit in Nigeria (Nwaru et al., 2011). Mpuga explains from his research in 
Uganda that the middle-aged head of household to receiving more as the need for credit increase 
with age until certain age. By fear of leaving debt for their children, head of household decreases 
their demand for credit as older they get (Mpuga, 2010).   
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The level of education obtained by the head of the household can be seen as positive advantage 
for receiving credit in informal credit. For the formal sector, education did not play any role 
according to the regression analysis. Variables that are found in the literatures have indicated 
to serve participators without educational background, giving educated head barriers(Yusuf 
Ibrahim Kofarmata, 6.10.2016). Literatures have found education to have both important and 
irrelevant effect on credit. Tang (et al 2010) have stated that educated household heads might 
approach informal market, based on knowledge on regulation of credit system for their own 
benefit. Further, the understanding of credit market system and diversification of their demand 
in different market (Yusuf Ibrahim Kofarmata, 6.10.2016). However, opposing literature such 
as Tin (Yusuf Ibrahim Kofarmata, 6.10.2016) have raised the matter of education to be negative.  
 
Gender was substantial for both market where female were constrained. Microfinance 
institutions such as women association arise to contribute and reinforce women in diverse 
developing economy according to Degefe (Obo, 2009). However, the result shows that more 
male household heads approach formal lenders more frequently than their female counterparts. 
Both in formal and informal market are the result of gender giving the same outcome. Meaning, 
household with female head are more often credit constrained in both market. The reduced 
number of female participator in the credit market can partially be the explanation for such 
outcome. Diverse social norms in developing countries can work as barrier for women for 
participation in economic activity, social roles, norms, household chores, social construction. 
As a combine result of such incidence female are more likely to be credit constrained (Steiner 
et al., 2009, Nwaru et al., 2011). Eyerusalem (Eyerusalem, 2014) reports several social 
obligation for women as barrier to enter credit market in Ethiopia. Such outcome appears in 
higher rate in rural areas than urban (Eyerusalem, 2014). The result of this study indicates the 
same, low participation of women in the credit market.  
 
The credit market outreach of formal and informal institutions to serve the diverse demand 
differs throughout the various regional states in Ethiopia. The occurrence of credit constrained 
households in Ethiopia is widespread across the whole country. Household resident in SNNP, 
Amhara, Tigray and Oromia are more likely to demand. To investigate if the demand for credit 
is tied to specific supplier, observations of demand in formal and informal sectors are 
conducted. From the result, outline of household demanding credit through formal and informal 
institution differs.  Both Ibrahim (Ibrahim et al., 2007) and Degfe (Obo, 2009) found common 
trends for regional variables in Ethiopia, similar to this study. Table 5.5 describes the outline of 
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credit distribution throughout the country. Degefe, reports formal institution for being scarce in 
Ethiopia (Obo, 2009) through his studies Tigray, Amhara and Oromia are the only regions to 
receive more from formal than informal suppliers. Regions such as Afar, Gambella, Harari, 
Somalie and Bensihagul-Gumuz were stated to lack established and developed formal 
association (Obo, 2009). As the result of this study, the insignificant estimates on regional 
variable can be somewhat explained. Moreover, Degefe states the presence of stabilized and 
established NGOs, microfinance institutions and development association in the rest the regions 
(Obo, 2009). 
Degefe, found in his research that 72 % of formal lenders to service the resident of Tigray (Obo, 
2009).Table 5.1 exhibits the finding of Degefe where Tigray region is to be dominant of formal 
lenders. The highly positive incidence of formal institution in Tigray requires further 
investigation. Findings from such research brought the Relife Society of Tigray (REST). These 
development association is stated to have been existing since 1978 (Obo, 2009, Haregeweyn et 
al., 2006). REST`s outreach and effectivity have been claimed to be among the most productive 
in Africa (Haregeweyn et al., 2006, Obo, 2009).   
Adverse event have given significant effect on demand for credit and transpires as uncertainty 
occasion. In such event, default might arise based on the risk and unexpected event that require 
funds(Tang et al., 2010). The risk involved might be based on the repayment ability, which can 
effect lenders decision. Lenders fear can arise as risk on default (Meyer, 2002).  
 
Amount, default rate and repayment time:  
Duration of the loan, size and default rate should be studied closer. Our data indicate great 
transaction of small amount of loans from the formal sector. However, few (3) high amount of 
credit have been given by commercial bank of Ethiopia (specific for 2 regions, Amhara & 
Oromo).  The efficiency of the formal creditors might also affect the accessibility and the 
service for the residence (ANJULO and HAWASSA, 2014).  The descriptive result achieved 
between large size and receiving of credit, have been explained by Oluwasola and Alimi in their 
study in Nigeria as, (Oluwasola and Alimi, 2008), due to ownership of large assets such as farm. 
Meaning, large family might also be owner of larger assets such as farm or other collateral.  
Ibrahim verifies the findings that most of household are credit constrained based on 
discouragement for application on credit (Ibrahim et al., 2007). In addition, informal institution 
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covers most of the credit resource, except for Tigray region. Household asset is another variable 
that are found to affect the access for credit both in this and in Ibrahim’s studies.     
In this study, the ineligible for credit have been defined as female, under the age of 29, above 
the age of 60, family member between 1-3 and household without asset such as house. While 
poor household, uneducated and household with children were classified as excluded according 
to Ibrahim. In addition, he stated nonappearance of gender discrimination, which conflicts with 
the results of this study.   
 
5.2 Policy  
Consequence of shortage on credit like it have also been mentioned to lead to less efficient 
development. As it is also explained credit can be view as element for alleviation from poverty 
(Braverman and Guasch, 1986, Obo, 2009). From the result it is explained that shortcoming of 
credit supplier can also effect the possibility of being credit constrained. By exploiting existing 
strong social ties policy targets may focus on financial linkage between formal and informal 
sectors to enhance access to credit in the future (Braverman and Guasch, 1986).  Another initial 
step can be women involvement in credit and empowering them with the right kind of tools.              
Lova and Sanchez, states that removing credit constrained to increase the probability of 
investment (but it is based on enterprise). They further suggest to increase level of practical 




Table 5-1 Developed institution in Ethiopia 
Regions Institution  
Tigray  Relief Society of Tigray (REST), Tigrayan 
Development Association (TDA) 
Amhara Amhara Development Association (ADA) 
SNNP Southerner Ethiopian People`s Development 
Association (SEPDA) 
Oromo Oromo Development Association (ODA) 
Addis Abeba and Dire Dawa National NGO`s  
  Source: Degefe, micro finance in Ethiopia 2009     
5.3 Limitation of data 
The limitation on this study occurs as result of lack on vital information on important variables 
from the ESS dataset and the countries imperfect credit market. Information on lenders strategy 
and targets are not reported in the ESS, due to their focus on agricultural factors. These leads 
to lack of variables such as default rate, cost of the loan, average repayment etc.       
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5.4 Conclusion  
 
- MFIs are the largest credit provider in formal sector, while relatives and neighbors 
account for more than 60 percent of the total loans in the informal sector. These indicate 
that household approach people they know for loans in informal sector.  
- Gender plays a great role in determining who gains access to credit. Male-headed 
households are more often demanding and receiving credit both from formal and 
informal credit markets, while the opposite was true for the female-headed households.  
- Participators in credit market that are under the age of 29 and above the ages of 60 are 
demanding and receiving less credit, while those between 30 &59 are both demanding 
and receiving more in both markets. This effect is even more pronounced in the informal 
markets.   
- Household heads without education have higher demand and get more credit in the 
formal markets, while their educated counterparts have the edge in the informal markets. 
- The households that could provide assets such as houses and business enterprises as 
collateral have an advantage in both formal and informal markets. 
- The household size is also important variable in determining the applicant’s success in 
the credit markets. Larger households are more likely to demand and receive credit in 
both markets. 
- The residence of Tigray and Amhara regional states have higher demand for credit than 
the other regional states. They along with the Oromia regional state have more of their 
demand credit covered from the formal sector than the remaining part of the country. 
Whereas the Harari, Somalie regional states have an absent formal credit market, and 
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Appendix A: Result form Heckman two-step estimation 
Code for Heckmans two-step estimation: 
xi: heckman cc i.region i.gender i.ownnonagricltureent size children adults age agesqu100 edu 
i.dwellingocc i.plantoopenbusiness, twostep select(demand = i.region i.gender 
i.ownnonagricltureent size children adults age agesqu100 edu i.dwellingocc 
i.plantoopenbusiness i.deathillness i.lostofincome i.climate i.shocksaccicdent i.pricechange 
i.other) rhosigma 
# Bivariate Probit regression with sample selection model can be conducted by two estimation 
procedures, two-step and maximum likelihood. The result and further explanation about two-
step procedure is shown in the appendix. Green (1992) indicate the standard errors on 
maximum likelihood procedure to be smaller than those yielded by the two-step estimation 
method do (Greene and Hensher, 2010).  
The regression analysis can also be conducted by the use of two-step estimation(ref. Nawata 
1994). The result achieved by the use of two-step estimation is shown in appendix B.1 It 
resembles with result attained though maximum-likelihood. The model is the same, just the 
procedure of the estimation that differs between maximum likelihood and two-step estimation 
(Nawata, 1994). Least square method is applied when we estimate by the use of Heckman`s 
two-step (Nawata 1994). For two-step estimation, first probit regression occurs. For the second 
equation Inverse Mills ratio is included in the regression to account for the data being non-




Appendix A.1: Regression result for formal sector    
 
   Two-step estimation     
     Formal 
     Demand Credit constrained Received 
     Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
          
Household characteristics         
Numbers of childeren  0,023 0,701 0,007 0,849 -0,01 0,319 
Numbers of adults   -0,0004 0,999 0,023 0,577 -0,013 0,223 
(Household size)   -0,012 0,826 -0,029 0,457 0,017 0,093 
          
Personal characteristics        
Age    0,013 0,136 -0,009 0,196 0,004 0,034 
Age square/100   -0,015 0,09 0,009 0,194 -0,004 0,046 
Gender (male)   -0,122 0,031 -0,196 0,000 0,052 0,000 
Own non-agric entrepr.  -0,109 0,142 -0,169 0,003 0,016 0,296 
Education   -0,169 0,002 -0,038 0,328 -0,005 0,68 
Plan to open business  -0,057 0,317 -0,216 0,000 0,027 0,014 
Owning a house/dwelling  -0,174 0,083 -0,187 0,010 0,057 0,002 
Regional characteristics        
          
Afar    -0,598 0,000 0,485 0,000 -0,262 0,000 
Amhara    -0,049 0,589 0,148 0,024 -0,112 0,000 
Oromia    0,064 0,491 0,456 0,000 -0,176 0,000 
Somalie    -0,155 0,276 0,662 0,000 -0,308 0,000 
Benshagul Gumuz   -0,173 0,286 0,537 0,000 -0,24 0,000 
SNNP    0,246 0,011 0,583 0,000 -0,231 0,000 
Gambelia    0,007 0,966 0,541 0,000 -0,266 0,000 
Harari    -0,795 0,000 0,234 0,041 -0,251 0,000 
Addis Ababa   -0,661 0,000 0,383 0,000 -0,188 0,000 
Dire Dawa   -0,285 0,037 0,381 0,001 -0,211 0,000 
 
Demand identification         
Death or illness   0,1006 0,418     
Loss of income   0,533 0,248     
Affected by climatic events  0,257 0,002     
Price change on food  0,266 0,007     
Shock/accicdent   0,233 0,002     
Other     0,073 0,679     
constant    1,371 0,000 0,652 0,000 0,119 0,012 
Significant at * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10% 
Rho= -0.496, sigma = 0.314, Mills lamda = -0.156, Wald chi2(21)= 414 with prob > chi2 =0.000 
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Two-step estimation     
     Informal 
     Demand Credit constrained Received 
     Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
          
Household characteristics         
Numbers of childeren  0,023 0,701 0,0103 0,801 0,006 0,709 
Numbers of adults   -0,0004 0,999 0,024 0,56 0,002 0,902 
(Household size)   -0,012 0,826 -0,031 0,427 -0,0039 0,81 
          
Personal characteristics        
Age    0,013 0,136 -0,009 0,186 -0,002 0,933 
Age square/100   -0,015 0,09 0,009 0,182 0,0001 0,954 
Gender (male)   -0,122 0,031 -0,198 0,000 0,03 0,083 
Own non-agric entrepr.  -0,109 0,142 -0,175 0,002 0,057 0,019 
Education   -0,169 0,002 -0,045 0,254 0,027 0,128 
Plan to open business  -0,057 0,317 -0,226 0,000 0,064 0,000 
Owning a house/dwelling  -0,174 0,083 -0,189 0,009 0,019 0,503 
Regional characteristics        
          
Afar    -0,598 0,000 0,506 0,000 0,071 0,230 
Amhara    -0,049 0,589 0,148 0,024 0,051 0,060 
Oromia    0,064 0,491 0,456 0,000 -0,017 0,532 
Somalie    -0,155 0,276 0,653 0,000 0,037 0,327 
Benshagul Gumuz   -0,173 0,286 0,547 0,000 0,029 0,578 
SNNP    0,246 0,011 0,602 0,000 -0,021 0,468 
Gambelia    0,007 0,966 0,552 0,000 0,045 0,397 
Harari    -0,795 0,000 0,226 0,053 0,145 0,027 
Addis Ababa   -0,661 0,000 0,375 0,000 0,035 0,503 
Dire Dawa   -0,285 0,037 0,353 0,001 0,055 0,185 
 
Demand identification         
Death or illness   0,1006 0,418     
Loss of income   0,533 0,248     
Affected by climatic events  0,257 0,002     
Price change on food  0,266 0,007     
Shock/accicdent   0,233 0,002     
Other     0,073 0,679     
constant    1,371 0,000 0,68 0 0,178 0,018 
Significant at * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10% 
Rho= -1, sigma= 0.516, Mills lamda= -0.516, Wald chi2(21)= 40.83 with prob > chi2 = 0.0059  
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Appendix A.3: Regression result for general  
   Two-step estimation     
     General 
     Demand Credit constrained Received 
     Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value 
          
Household characteristics         
Numbers of childeren  0,023 0,701 0,004 0,854 -0,004 0,862 
Numbers of adults   -0,0004 0,999 0,01 0,646 -0,103 0,64 
(Household size)   -0,128 0,826 -0,013 0,539 0,013 0,534 
          
Personal characteristics        
Age    0,014 0,136 -0,003 0,383 0,003 0,368 
Age square/100   -0,016 0,09 0,003 0,397 -0,003 0,388 
Gender (male)   -0,122 0,031 -0,082 0,000 0,083 0 
Own non-agric entrepr.  -0,109 0,142 -0,074 0,017 0,075 0,018 
Education   -0,169 0,002 -0,022 0,341 0,023 0,312 
Plan to open business  -0,057 0,317 -0,092 0,000 0,092 0 
Owning a house/dwelling  -0,175 0,083 -0,075 0,047 0,076 0,047 
Regional characteristics        
          
Afar    -0,598 0,000 0,192 0,012 -0,192 0,012 
Amhara    -0,049 0,589 0,063 0,073 -0,062 0,079 
Oromia    0,064 0,491 0,193 0,000 -0,194 0,000 
Somalie    -0,155 0,276 0,269 0,000 -0,27 0,000 
Benshagul Gumuz   -0,173 0,286 0,211 0,002 -0,211 0,002 
SNNP    0,246 0,011 0,25 0,000 -0,251 0,000 
Gambelia    0,007 0,966 0,221 0,001 0,221 0,002 
Harari    -0,795 0,000 0,097 0,251 -0,097 0,253 
Addis Ababa   -0,661 0,000 0,154 0,023 -0,154 0,024 
Dire Dawa   -0,285 0,037 0,155 0,005 -0,155 0,005 
 
Demand identification         
Death or illness   0,1001 0,418     
Loss of income   0,534 0,248     
Affected by climatic events  0,256 0,002     
Price change on food  0,267 0,007     
Shock/accicdent   0,234 0,002     
Other     0,074 0,679     
constant    1,371 0 0,696 0 0,299 0,002 
Significant at * 1%, ** 5%, *** 10% 




Stata Codes for this study (general, formal and informal)   
Bivariate Probit regression with sample selection (ml), code 
xi: heckprob cc i.region i.gender i.ownnonagricltureent size children adults age agesqu100 
edu i.dwellingocc i.plantoopenbusiness, select(demand = i.region i.gender 
i.ownnonagricltureent size children adults age agesqu100 edu i.dwellingocc 




Heckman sample selection (two-step), code 
xi: heckman cc i.region i.gender i.ownnonagricltureent size children adults age agesqu100 edu 
i.dwellingocc i.plantoopenbusiness, twostep select(demand = i.region i.gender 
i.ownnonagricltureent size children adults age agesqu100 edu i.dwellingocc 
i.plantoopenbusiness i.deathillness i.lostofincome i.climate i.shocksaccicdent i.pricechange 
i.other) rhosigma 
 
# The data set and the original ESS survey is also attached 
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Appendix C:  
Table: C.1 Sample design by region and zone in rural and urban area from ESS 
 
Source: From ESS  
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Table: C.2 Files for household  
 
Source: From ESS 
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Table C.3 Description of variabels used  
Variable Observation  Mean Std. Dev.       
Region 5165 5.6374 3.8999 
No Demand 5165 0.0997 0.2996 
Receive 5165 0.2581 0.4376 
Demand 5165 0.9003 0.2996 
Credit constriant 5165 0.6424 0.4793 
Size 5165 4.9076 2.5517 
Children 5165 2.0404 1.7973 
Adults 5165 2.8666 1.5556 
Age 5165 44.1696 15.5957 
Age squared/100 5165 21.8956 15.4528 
Education 5165 0.4822 0.4997 
Formal 5156 0.1032 0.3042 
Informal  5165 0.145 0.3614 
Gender ~Male 5165 0.6964 0.4598 
Own enterprise  5165 0.1129 0.3164 
Ownin house 5165 0.7212 0.4484 
Renting house 5165 0.2037 0.4028 
Plan to open 
business 
5165 0.2437 0.4294 
Death/ illness 5165 0.0501 0.2182 
Loss of income 5165 0.0060 0.0772 
Climate effect 5165 0.1392 0.3461 
Shock/accident 5165 0.1864 0.3895 
Price change 5165 0.1022 0.3029 
Other 5165 0.0243 0.1542 
Source: From ESS  
 
